Abstract -As a 'general principle', good faith forms part of the sources of international law. Still not widely examined in relation to rights and obligations, the aim here is to demonstrate the specific characteristics of the principle. In general, international law rules such as pacta sunt servanda, abuse of rights, estoppel and acquiescence and the negotiation of disputes are grounded, to some extent, in good faith. In treaty law, good faith has various manifestations from the time prior to signature through to interpretation. These are outlined here. The article argues that good faith acts to mediate the effects of States' rights in international law, in order to achieve acceptable results when competing interests exist. Fundamentally, good faith is a limitation of State sovereignty, albeit one that is necessary, as it protects other States and their trust and reliance in international law.
legal value of the principle of good faith in municipal legal systems, the means of transmuting this understanding of good faith into international law, and the differences and difficulties of this undertaking. Secondly, specific aspects of good faith are examined with particular reference to the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. Thirdly, the relation between the principle of good faith and sovereignty is assessed. The argument is that good faith acts as a means of limiting state sovereignty that is inherent in international law. Then, the impact of good faith is examined in the law of treaties, before the final conclusion.
Good faith as a principle, a rule, or something altogether different?
In his Hague Academy Lecture in 1957, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice stated: "By a principle, or general principle, as opposed to a rule, even a general rule, of law is meant chiefly something which is not itself a rule, but which underlies a rule, and explains or provides a reason for it. A rule answers the question 'what': a principle in effect answers the question 'why'." 6 Ronald Dworkin distinguishes rules from principles by the fact that rules always apply in an unconditional, all-or-nothing way, whereas a principle will only act as a guide in a decision-making process. 7 This distinction will provide a useful aid in determining the scope of good faith in its specific forms: while good faith can have an important role in the determination of obligations, it will generally not be the source of such obligations. This article argues that good faith serves a mediatory role between a rule and a principle.
the abstract notion of the principle. This is necessary, as good faith has limited practical application unless a court is in a position to examine and assess the conduct of the State concerned, and apply the principle accordingly. 9 In order to identify common traits in three municipal legal systems, basic structures of this process can be identified in German, French, and English law.
In Germany good faith is most prominently codified in § 242 of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, hereafter 'BGB'), which states: "[t]he debtor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, taking customary practice into consideration." As a 'general clause' (Generalklausel), the judiciary and legal scholars have crafted and refined distinct legal precepts that can be applied to individual cases. 10 Since a general clause is an open-ended legal provision, § 242 BGB requires balancing diverging interests in an individual case, in order to find the legal value of the provision and to make it applicable to a factual scenario. The direct application of good faith has therefore been limited to casuistry, i.e. an application of corrective justice tailored to the individual case. 11 Some particular aspects that have developed are the prohibition of an abuse of rights (Rechtsmissbrauch), 12 equitable estoppel (based on the principle of venire contra factum proprium), 13 and acquiescence due to lapse of time (Verwirkung). 14 The judiciary has had a prominent role in shaping the foundations of good faith: from a public law standpoint, the Lüth decision of the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 15 paved the way for aspects of fundamental rights to be read into the general 9 12 BGHZ 30, 140, 140; Schubert and Roth (n 11) para 235; Looschelders and Olzen (n 10) para 214. 13 BGHZ 50, 191, 196 ; Schubert and Roth (n 11) para 319; Looschelders and Olzen (n 10) para 286. 14 BGHZ 105, 290, 298 ; Schubert and Roth (n 11) para 329; Looschelders and Olzen (n 10) para 302. 15 there are several legal mechanisms that can deal with instances of perceived unfairness; these include misrepresentation and mistake, undue influence, estoppel 24 and so on, as well as developments in equity.
25
Lord Denning attempted (albeit obiter), in Lloyds Bank v Bundy, the introduction of a general doctrine of unequal bargaining power. 26 However, this approach was rejected by the House of Lords in National Westminster v Morgan, where it was held that Denning's approach was neither justified, nor necessary, nor even desirable. 27 The reasons for the reluctance of English courts to develop and apply a standard of good faith in contract law have been described as being threefold: firstly, the English courts adhere to the strongly individualistic nature of bargaining for one's own end, which necessitates the shunning of elements of social justice. 28 Secondly, the courts have been reluctant to introduce a general principle of fairness. The competence to make such an encroachment into the law of contract is believed to lie with Parliament. 29 The favoured piecemeal approach can be applied case-by-case, in order to select instances of manifest injuriousness and apply corrective means on an individual basis. 30 Lastly, the elements of predictability and stability of the common law are seen as factors for the rejection of a general clause of good faith: as such a clause would be difficult to define, it would risk being too ambiguous to be enforced. 3. Importing municipal law into the Law of Nations "lock, stock and barrel"? When international courts and tribunals look to general principles of law, the private law institutions are not imported into international law 'lock, stock, and barrel'. 32 Rather, in the words of Judge McNair, "the duty of international tribunals is to regard any features or terminology which are reminiscent of the rules and institutions of private law as an indication of policy and principles rather than as directly importing these rules and institutions." 33 Accordingly, two levels have to be distinguished at which good faith has a legal value. Even though the principle of good faith has a well-defined municipal law counterpart, the international legal system has not imported these in its totality. Rather, a nuanced approach has been favoured. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been reticent to turn directly to municipal law, in order to determine aspects of good faith. 34 Yet, the general principles of municipal law require some mechanism in order to be 'elevated' into international law. 35 Since an undifferentiated transmutation of municipal into international law is not applied, a different method has to be discerned. The method favoured by the Court seems to be a careful process of analogy. The municipal legal systems are examined in order to find a general legal rule that can be defined and stated in a 'pure form', which is achieved by making it widely applicable to the special interests that States have in their legal relations. By replacing the parties with algebraic forms, i.e. x and y, which are then replaced with State A and State B, the distilled rule is found and applied; if the general principle can still be applied in congruity with the aspects that are specific to international law, then the general principle is applied in the given case. 
Differences between national and international conceptions of good faith
As municipal legal systems display different means of applying good faith, no single method can be identified. 37 International law differs markedly from municipal law through its lack of comparable norm-creating and enforcement institutions. The system of international law is based on a voluntarist and co-operative character, best exemplified by the acceptance, for the most part, of customary international law; i.e. the law created and observed by the States themselves. There is, by and large, no central legislative body in international law.
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Without a central body to legislate in this area, an all-pervading obligation of good faith in international law is difficult to establish. 40 The ICJ's case law is defined enough to act as a central source of guidance in applying the principle of good faith, but it is not competent to act as a law-generating institution. 41 Indeed, it is questionable whether the international judiciary, made up of courts and tribunals, is best placed to serve an active role in the creation of good faith casuistry. The differing attitudes to the desirability of judicial activism in municipal legal systems would be greatly amplified in international law. In municipal law, good faith acts to balance out unequal sides of a bargain. 42 In international law this asymmetrical power balance, whether real or perceived, is absent. 41 Cf Thirlway (n 25) 58 (on the ICJ's reluctance to be seen as "legislating"). 42 Looschelders and Olzen (n 10) para 147; Klaus Adomeit, 'Die gestörte Vertragsparität-Ein Trugbild' (1994) 38 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2467, 2468.
"entering the Family of Nations a State comes as an equal to equals". 43 This does not necessarily mean that States are completely equal as regards power, territory, and the like. But as States, they are legally equal, at least in principle, whatever differences between them may otherwise exist. 44 As a result, even though sovereign equality can still serve to protect weaker States from the hegemony of stronger States, 45 the fundamental conception of good faith as a means of corrective justice is not directly applicable to the relations between States.
B. SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Like municipal law, good faith in international law has been subject to concretisations. In order for the international legal order to be predictable and consistent, scholars have examined and clarified the doctrinal aspects of these concretisations, while judicial bodies have applied them to factual scenarios. Though far from conclusive, four main concretisations are examined here, namely the maxim pacta sunt servanda, abuse of rights and discretion, estoppel and acquiescence, and negotiations in good faith. These have been subject to important judicial decisions and are recognised as sources of international law.
Pacta sunt servanda
The maxim 'pacta sunt servanda' has been said to relate solely to the law of treaties. 46 However, based on good faith, the ICJ has found that that a State can be bound by a unilateral act alone: a public statement made by a State, with an intention to be bound, can create legal obligations, which could otherwise only be created through a treaty. The rationale behind the maxim is seemingly self-evident: a need by the international community for a system that can ensure international order The French Government declared that no more nuclear tests would be conducted in the Pacific. In this case the Court gave these statements by a State (the declaring State) the same legal effects that can usually only be attributed to a binding synallagmatic treaty towards the receiving State. The Court found that if some prerequisites were met, then a unilateral declaration can bind a State; these are: the context of the statement, the intention of the declaring State, no necessary acceptance by the receiving State or observance of formal requirements. 49 For present purposes, the context and intent are most important. The statement's context is important: it must be made publicly; a receiving State must be able to take cognisance of the declaration. The most important aspect of the binding nature is the (subjective) intention of the declaring State, as this distinguishes the statement from other, nonbinding statements. However, the (objective) trust and confidence that is placed in the statement by the receiving State is paramount to the creation of an obligation; here good faith acts as the norm regulating the legal effect of the act. 50 The Court's reasoning shows that good faith can be a basis for 47 Igor Ivanovich Lukashuk, 'The Principle Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Nature of Obligation under International Law' (83) AJIL 1989 513. 48 Nuclear Tests Case (n 2) para 46 (emphasis added). 49 The element of a form requirement is negligible, as international law imposes no strict requirements, therefore the statement may be made orally or in writing; cf Nuclear Tests Case (n 2) para 45. a State exercises a right for an end which it was not intended for (improper purposes); (c) arbitrary exercise of a right causing injury to another party. As a result, the concept of abuse of right is often discussed in conjunction with the element of discretion that a State has in the exercise of 51 Cf Vaughan Lowe, International Law, (OUP 2007) 74. 52 Jennings and Watts (n 39) 1190; The ILC has undertaken the task of examining the unilateral acts of state as a topic of appropriate for codification (cf ILC, 'Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol II Part 2 (1996) A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/add.1 (Part 2) 141); Thirlway is critical of the Court's use of terminology here (cf Thirlway (n 25) 10). In his opinion the ICJ wanted to enunciate the principle to the effect that the giving of consent (consent to be bound) creates legal obligations. It is submitted, however, that, even if this were the case, the Court made itself clear in assigning trust and confidence a pronounced role in its judgment. 53 admission of a new Member State to the UN, the Court was faced with Art. 4 (1) UN Charter. This provision laid out the prerequisites which a State must meet in order to be admitted to the UN. The question was whether the list of five conditions set out in Art. 4 (1) UN Charter were conclusive, or whether other (political) considerations could be taken into account. The conditions are that the candidate must be a State, which is peace-loving, accepts the obligations of the Charter, and is both able and willing to carry out these obligations. 65 The Court concluded that no other conditions could be taken into account. 66 The interesting aspect to note here is that the Court stated that, while discretion could be used by the voting State, it was curtailed by the limits set by Art. 4 (1) UN Charter. 67 The dissenting judges agreed to the extent that the discretion was curtailed, but by the object and purpose of the UN Charter generally. For the evaluation of the relevance of good faith in determinations of this kind, it has to be noted that the judges all agreed that the discretion inherent in the right to vote must be guided by considerations of justice 68 and must be "exercised in good faith", 69 a duty that is also codified in Art. 2 (2) of the Charter.
ii. Environmental cases
Abuse of rights can also become particularly relevant when environmental resources are shared. 70 Two cases highlight how an abuse of rights can arise between neighbouring States. The Trail Smelter Arbitration dealt with the fumes and air pollution produced by a Canadian smelter situated on the border of the US state of Washington. 71 In the Pulp Mills Case, the ICJ had to decide a case brought by Argentina against Uruguay. Here a pulp mill had been built on the banks of the shared Uruguay River, which created pollution and affected Argentina's use of the river. 72 In both cases a State had built, or was planning to build, an industrial plant (the utilising State) that was going to cause some measure of environmental damage to neighbouring territory. Both developments were subject to international treaties outlining the obligations that the States had in relation to the undertaking. The territorial sovereignty of a State allows for the exploitation of natural resources. However, this right is limited when the rights of another State are at stake. The cases have both focussed on the balancing act to be conducted by the utilising State. Cheng calls this the "interdependence" of rights: "every right is subject to such limitations as are necessary to render it compatible both with a party's contractual obligations and with his obligations under the general law". 73 If the utilising State uses its resources in a way that is suited to deprive the neighbouring State of its own right, an abuse of right by the utilising State may occur. However, an abuse of rights would require some element of positive bad faith, e.g. when the damage caused by the utilising State is greater than its own gain. 74 It is submitted, therefore, that there is a duty based on good faith, but under the threshold of abuse of rights, to the extent that a State may only use an absolute right in a way that does not cause damage to another. Both judgments also dealt extensively with the duty to negotiate the effects of the industrial production, an aspect of good faith that will be examined below. 
iii. Criticisms by Schwarzenberger/ Brown and Lowe
The broadness of the definition and the difficulty in applying abuse of right has brought it substantial criticism as a general principle. 76 Schwarzenberger and Brown have stated that it is difficult to establish what constitutes an abuse of rights as opposed to a harsh, yet justified use of a right. 77 The determination is necessarily one that is subjective, along with being case-dependent, so that there is no place for the concept as a general principle of law. 78 However, they go on to state that good faith has its place in treaty relations between States. 79 On the other hand, Lowe states that concepts like abuse of rights are interstitial rights; as such they do not have an independent normative function, but are to be seen as concomitant with the obligations that they underpin. 80 Even if abuse of right is not in itself a general principle, it can act as a yardstick for the extent of rights and obligations, especially in relation to other States that may be affected as a result. Finally, the modern jurisprudence of the ICJ suggests that the Court will be slow to assume an abuse of rights, unless the evidence is explicitly clear, and that it will favour the interpretation of the parties' acts or agreements, in order to determine the scope of the right or obligation, before reaching such a conclusion. 81 Abuse of rights still remains relatively loosely defined and needs to be "pruned of its exuberances", 82 if it is to become a specific rule of customary international law. A lack of consistent State practice means it is not likely a rule of customary international law. However, it can be helpful in determining the use and scope of rights in situations of interdependence. The doctrinal groundwork, particularly in relation to the uses of abuse of rights in municipal law, can work to shed some light on how to approach this conflict between States in international law.
Estoppel and acquiescence
Further aspects of good faith in international law, which have fairly well established private law counterparts, are the principles of estoppel and acquiescence. A considerable weight of authority supports the view that estoppel is a general principle of international law, resting on principles of good faith and consistency. 83 Even though private law, particularly the common law, has developed a very multi-faceted approach with variations of estoppel (promissory, equitable, by silence etc.), international law also has its own (albeit more basic) conception. Under the principle of estoppel, a party is not permitted to take up a legal position that is in contradiction with its own previous representations or conduct, when another party has been led to assume obligations towards, or attribute rights to the former party in reliance upon such representations or conduct. 84 Even though municipal law, particularly contract law, has many different formulations of this behaviour (such as the notion of venire contra factum proprium 85 ), in international law the remit is broader. 86 The legitimate reliance of one State (State A) on the conduct of another (State B) precludes this State from acting contrary to its representations. If State B then acts contrary to this representation, it is acting without good faith and therefore in contravention of international law. The principle helps to safeguard a State's legitimate reliance on the actions of other States, in the sense that faith and confidence are protected when they are placed reasonably on the actions of another. This constitutes one of the most important aspects of good faith. 87 A related, yet distinguishable, aspect is acquiescence, which can be described as the inaction of a State, which is faced with a situation constituting a threat to, or infringement of, its rights. 88 The two defining differences between estoppel and acquiescence are the components of time and reliance: estoppel hinges on previous presentations; while acquiescence is that passivity in relation to a right of another State to the extent that good faith affords the passivity the character of consent. 89 In the Gulf of Maine Case the ICJ acknowledged the legal effect of a "qualified silence" when it stated that it is "equivalent to tacit recognition manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party may interpret as consent". 90 One of the inherent difficulties of acquiescence is the establishment of the true intent of the silent state, which is inevitably a legal fiction. 91 Showing that a State meant to say something (subjective aspect), while remaining silent (objective aspect) has considerable procedural difficulties. The fiction that a State has indeed acquiesced to an infringement of its rights can only be justified if due regard is had to the reasonable trust that the other State had in the subjective value of the silence. 92 The concepts of estoppel and acquiescence have featured strongly in border and land title disputes. 93 In this context, the ground-breaking decision was the Temple of Preah Vihear Case. The Temple is an archaeologically and artistically important sanctuary, situated on the Dangrek Mountains between Cambodia and Thailand. In 1904 a Treaty had been signed by France (on behalf of its protectorate, present day Cambodia) with Siam (now Thailand). This called for the delimitation of the area to be performed by a mixed Commission, which produced its maps in 1907 and posited the Temple in Cambodian territory. However, Thailand took the view that it possessed the area surrounding the Temple and took control of the site. Cambodia's diplomatic efforts to regain the territory failed and the case was referred to the ICJ. The Court relied on acquiescence and estoppel, 94 rather than looking to the cultural, historic, or religious factors, the ICJ deemed that Thailand should have objected to the maps in a timely manner. Thailand entered no reservations to the original Treaty disputing the accuracy of the Commission's maps. Further Friendship Treaty negotiations (in 1925 and 1937) and a Franco-Siamese reconciliation Committee (set up in 1947) also ended with agreements being signed, yet with no reservations entered in respect of the original maps. Coupled with the objective of creating stability and finality 95 through the demarcation of borders, a legitimate reliance by Cambodia was implied. 96 Thailand was therefore estopped from raising any objections to the original 1907 maps at the present time, having not made declarations to that effect before. The primary foundation of the principle of estoppel is, as Judge Alfaro noted, "the good faith that must prevail in international relations, inasmuch as consistency of conduct or opinion on the part of the State to the prejudice of another is incompatible with good faith."
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Acquiescence and estoppel ascribe substantial legal consequences to the inactivity of a State; as such, these institutions should be restrictively interpreted and applied. They find their justification in the reasonable reliance of one State (based on good faith) on the representation or conduct of another.
98 A State has the ability to make declarations to preserve its rights and preclude the effects of tacit consent, 99 placing the onus of action on the State that has allowed the reliance and trust.
Negotiations in good faith
When States negotiate it is not enough for representatives to meet and discuss. Good faith negotiations require the parties to demonstrate 'reasonable regard' for the other's rights and interests. Further, the parties must, with a view to end the dispute amicably, aim for a clear result; in short: the negotiations must be meaningful. 100 Unjustifiably breaking off the negotiations, creating abnormal delays, disregarding the agreed procedures, or systematic refusal to take into consideration adverse proposals or interests can amount to breaches of good faith. 101 Even when 95 Cf MacGibbon (n 83) 468 f. there is only a small chance that the negotiations will end in success, the parties are bound by a duty to endeavour to end the dispute. 102 However, there appears to be no general rule of international law requiring the negotiations to be exhausted before a judicial settlement may be sought. 103 So far, the ICJ has only developed the obligation to negotiate in good faith in relation to legal rights and has not expanded the notion to any acts between States that do not relate to a legal obligation. 104 In 1971 Iceland unilaterally announced that it was extending its exclusive fishing zone to 50 nautical miles, thereby terminating agreements it had with Germany and the UK. A dispute ensued before the ICJ. On the merits the Court stressed the need to reconcile the disputed fishing rights through negotiations. The Court also issued the parties with the objectives, which the negotiations should cover, e.g. delimiting the fishing rights, catch-limitations, share allocation and restrictions and required that they should be conducted in good faith. 105 This judgment builds on the obligation for the negotiations to be 'meaningful', as the Court had noted in an earlier case.
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C. THE INTERRELATION OF GOOD FAITH WITH SOVEREIGNTY
Historically the principle of internal sovereignty has been understood as the supreme authority, or ultimate power, of a State within its territory, 107 while the external sovereignty is the dimension that pertains to the international rights and duties of a State in relation to other States. 108 In 1927, the Regarding the adherence to treaty relations, the limitation of sovereignty is less controversial, as the binding nature of the treaty has been the subject to consent by the State. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) has, on this point, gone on to state that: "According to the principle of international law that treaty obligations are to be executed in perfect good faith, therefore excluding the right to legislate at will concerning the subject matter of the treaty, and limiting the exercise of sovereignty of the State bound by a treaty with respect to that subject matter to 1. Treaty formation and the element of good faith in Art. 18 VCLT After signing (but before ratifying) a treaty, a party has an obligation to observe the terms of the treaty. If a measure is taken after signature that breaches this obligation, one that is based on good faith, reciprocity can allow the other treaty party to repudiate the treaty or to claim compensation for any diminution of value. 117 The element of good faith in treaty formation is found in Art. 18 VCLT. This article protects the legitimate expectations of the other participants in the treaty-making process, and is therefore based on good faith. 118 Whether or not the signatory State ratifies the treaty is a matter of discretion; however, the consent-based act of placing a signature on the treaty may act to reduce this discretion, so that a State may not exploit the signed text for its own purposes by abusing its inherent discretion to ratify. 119 It is submitted, though, that there does not exist enough state practice to point to a rule that signature of a treaty leads to a good faith obligation to ratify, but only an obligation not to defeat the purpose or material normative content of the treaty in question. 125 The
Court, after affirming that good faith forms part of EU law, formulated that the specifically European legal principle of 'legitimate expectations' is a corollary of this general principle. 126 This further shows that good faith has also taken on a regional customary international law standing (at least as part of EU law). 127 obligation: the determination of the object (i.e. the treaty) to be performed in good faith, as well as the manner in which the obligation is performed. 128 The material duty to act in good faith during the performance of a treaty was stated by Waldock in the ILC's Report as "one of good faith and not stricti juris". 129 This suggests that the object and intention of the parties is paramount, rather than a literal observation of the wording of the treaty.
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A treaty should be performed with the intentions of the parties in mind, rather than looking to a formalistic understanding of the wording. Since the element of good faith is again context-dependent, the duty needs to be applied to the specific details of a case. 131 It is submitted that elements of the general principles of law that relate to abuse of right, estoppel, and other aspects of good faith may find an analogous application to the performance of treaty obligations.
Good faith in treaty interpretation
Art. 31 VCLT states that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning". Given that the obligation in Art. 26 VCLT applies to the entire process, the interpretation of the treaty is no different. The exact contours of how to interpret a treaty in good faith are difficult, yet an element of 'reasonableness' must be inherent when an interpretation is advanced. 132 Two aspects that can add contour when interpreting a treaty reasonably are the effectiveness of the interpretation (as an extension), and the imposition of new obligations (as a limitation). Both of these have a basis in good faith. As a means of interpretation, effet utile helps extend the meaning of the wording past its literal sense, as recourse has to be taken to "what the parties did mean when they used these words". 133 The principle was left out teleological interpretation, 134 which could lead to unwritten (or implied) powers being read into treaties. However, based on the object and purpose of a treaty and a good faith interpretation of it, the favourable construction of a treaty can be achieved of upholding the treaty rather than destroying it (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). 135 In most cases this will also align with the expectations of the signatory parties, and is a way of interpreting treaties with recourse to good faith. The ordinary meaning of the treaty and the prohibition of creating additional obligations place a limitation on the interpretation.
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The obligation to interpret a treaty according to good faith finds its limitations in the creation of new obligations which are no longer covered either by the wording of the treaty or the intent of the signatories. 137 The approach indicated by judicial practice aims to clear up ambiguous wording, yet not to act as a gap-filling function in order to create new obligations. 138 By advancing an interpretation that adds (or creates)
obligations for another party, not intended or covered by the wording of the treaty, this party may be acting in bad faith. Even though an undoubted element of good faith pervades the interpretation of international agreements, the ICJ has not yet interpreted a treaty based solely on good faith. 139 Therefore, it is submitted that, while the ICJ has an undoubtedly well-crafted canon of interpretation that it can draw on, 140 the principle of good faith is also of an interstitial nature when it comes to treaty interpretation. In this regard it functions as a principle lending contours without imposing specific obligations 141 or creating a specific means of constructing a treaty based on good faith alone.
E. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, good faith as a general principle of law is familiar from municipal law, but striking in its differences when assessed in the practice of international law. Having examined the specific aspects of good faith and how international jurisprudence has crafted justiciable concretisations out of a vague notion, one conclusion becomes very clear. Whether in general international law or in the law of treaties, good faith acts a limitation. The limitations that the observation of good faith places on States regulate the performance of rights and obligations in international discourse. As well as the explicit duties of good faith in treaty law, general international law places legal consequences on actions that are predicated on good faith. Returning to Fitzmaurice's statement: while a rule answers 'what' and a principle answers 'why', the principle of good faith regulates 'how'. 142 As international law becomes more fragmented and dispersed in 'self-contained' regimes, the role of good faith will extend and create more permutations of this limitation, as, fundamentally, good faith acts to give legal value to the expectations that States have in the actions of other States. Good faith might therefore not be readily definable in abstract terms, it is however indispensable.
